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Using micro price data across US cities, we provide evidence that both the volatility and persistence
of deviations from the law of one price (LOP) are positively correlated with the distance between cities.
A standard, two-city, equilibrium model with time-varying technology under homogeneous information
can predict the relationship between the volatility and distance but not between the persistence and
distance. To account for the latter fact, we augment the standard model with noisy signals about the
state of nominal aggregate demand that are asymmetric across cities. We further establish that the
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Trade costs still matter even among highly integrated economies. Anderson and van Win-
coop (2004) show how theoretical gravity models of trade rationalize a negative relationship
between bilateral trade ￿ ows and distance or a positive relationship between bilateral price
deviations and distance. In this context, distance is viewed as a reasonable proxy for trade
costs between cities or countries. They show that a variant of a static Ricardian model of
Eaton and Kortum (2002) can explain the cross-sectional dispersion of the law of one price
(LOP) deviations with trade costs that vary across location pairs. A similar implication can
also be obtained using the static gravity model of Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008)
which allows self-selection of ￿rms into export markets.1 In the macroeconomics literature,
time-series volatility of LOP deviations often replaces cross-sectional dispersion when running
a gravity-type regression. For example, Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001)
￿nd that the higher volatility is associated with greater distance between cities. Crucini,
Shintani, and Tsuruga (2010a, hereafter CST) develop a simple dynamic rational expecta-
tions model where intra-national LOP deviations are driven by time-varying technology, and
claim that it can account for the positive correlation between the time-series volatility and
trade costs.
In addition to the volatility, the persistence has long been employed in the macroeconomic
literature when evaluating the degree of LOP deviations using time-series data. Compared to
the volatility-distance correlation, however, less attention has been paid to the persistence-
distance correlation.2 We aim to ￿ll this gap. The main objective of this paper is to under-
stand both empirically and theoretically whether LOP persistence is rising in the distance
separating retail markets. Using micro data on price di⁄erences across US cities, we ￿nd
that persistence, as well as volatility, is positively correlated with the distance between cities.
We then provide a theoretical framework to explain this empirical ￿nding. We show that
the simple setting of CST, which can explain the positive volatility-distance correlation, does
not explain the positive persistence-distance correlation. We thus extend the basic dynamic
model of CST to incorporate imperfect common knowledge developed by Woodford (2003),
Angeletos and La￿ O (2009), among others.
In the macroeconomics literature, it has been widely argued that heterogeneous expecta-
tions with imperfect common knowledge help to generate more plausible predictions about
1See Kano, Kano and Takechi (2010).
2Few exceptions include Parsley and Wei (1996), Cecchetti, Mark and Sonara (2004), and Choi and
Matsubara (2007).
2the in￿ ation-output trade-o⁄ than homogeneous expectations. Woodford (2003) extends the
model of Lucas (1972) and Phelps (1970) with homogeneous expectations by introducing
assumptions of (i) heterogenous expectations with strategic complementarities in ￿rm￿ s de-
cision making under monopolistic competition and (ii) nominal aggregate demand shocks
which cannot be commonly known even in the long-run. Subsequent work by Angeletos
and La￿ O (2009) simpli￿es the second assumption to the case where shocks will be publicly
known after one period, and suggest that the introduction of sticky prices into the ￿ exible
price model of imperfect common knowledge can improve predictions on in￿ ation and output
dynamics (see also Fukunaga, 2007). Following this line of research, we apply information
frictions to explain the persistence and volatility of intra-national LOP deviations. In partic-
ular, we ask if the model armed with heterogeneous expectations can account for the positive
persistent-distance correlation.3 In answering the question, we modify a dynamic model of
intra-national LOP deviations used in CST by introducing the assumption of heterogeneous
expectations about the state of nominal demand across cities in the economy. Our analytical
result shows that our two-city model can successfully explain both the persistence-distance
and the volatility-distance correlations, when information precision across cities is heteroge-
nous. We also con￿rm that our results are robust to extensions that includes sticky prices or
more than two cities.
The intuition is that intra-national LOP deviations with imperfect information consist of
two components: technological di⁄erences across two locations, and information heterogeneity
about nominal shocks across two locations. In our model, the latter is not as persistent as
the former, since the di⁄erence in perception between locations disappears after one period.
Overall persistence of LOP deviations is thus determined by the relative importance of the two
components. A positive technology shock in one location generates LOP deviations since price
reductions fail to transmit fully to the other location in the presence of trade costs. Therefore,
when the trade cost is high, the relative contribution from persistent technological di⁄erentials
becomes large and LOP deviations become more persistent. This implies a positive correlation
between trade costs and persistence of LOP deviations.
Persistence of the real exchange rates have long attracted the economists￿attention both
at the aggregate level (Frankel, 1986, Rogo⁄, 1996, and Lothian and Taylor, 1996) and at
the disaggregated level (Parsley and Wei, 1996, Crucini and Shintani, 2008) since violation
3An alternative approach of introducing heterogeneous expectations is to consider infrequent information
updating scheme refered to as sticky information by Mankiw and Reis (2002). Crucini, Shintani, and Tsuruga
(2010b) introduce sticky information structure to a multi-city model to increase the predicted persistence of
LOP deviations, but not to generate correlation between the persistence and distance.
3of mean reversion suggests that purchasing power parity and LOP do not hold even in the
long-run. One possible explanation for the high observed persistence of the deviations is the
non-linearity of response generated by the presence of trade costs. For example, Obstfeld and
Taylor (1997) estimate a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with the price di⁄erential
following a random walk within the band of arbitrage but converging to the level of trade
cost from outside the band.4 Taylor (2001) points out that when the threshold (which may
be interpreted as a measure of trade cost) becomes larger, observed persistence becomes
higher. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), however, express some reservations and argue
that such an arbitrage equation is ￿of limited relevance in understanding the link between
price di⁄erentials and trade costs in most markets (p. 738).￿
Below, we begin with our empirical evidence in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide a
theoretical model and investigate its implications for LOP dynamics. Robustness of the our
result to some extensions is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Regressions
2.1 Data
We use quarterly data on the individual prices from the American Chamber of Commerce
Researchers Association (ACCRA) Cost of Living Index produced by the Council of Com-
munity and Economic Research. The original ACCRA Cost of Living Index includes 75
goods and services across 632 cities. However, to construct the balanced panel, the numbers
of goods and services and cities were reduced to 48 items and 52 cities, respectively. The
sample period is from 1990:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The data is the same as used by Yazgan and
Yilmazkuday (2011).5
In measuring the LOP deviations, we follow Crucini and Shintani (2008) and consider all
possible city pairs for each good or service. Let qj;k;t (i) be the LOP deviation measured as
the log of the price of good i in city j relative to the price of the same good in city k:
qj;k;t (i) = lnPj;t (i) ￿ lnPk;t (i);
for i = 1;2;:::;48 and for any j 6= k. Here j and k (= 1;2;:::;52) index the cities. Because
4See also Michael, Nobay, and Peel (1996) and O￿ Connell (1998).
5For the detailed explanation on the selection of goods and services and cities, see Yazgan and Yilmazkuday
(2011).
4the number of cities is 52, the total number of city pairs is 1,326 in our data set. We
follow Parsley and Wei (1996) and divide goods and services into three categories: tradable
perishables, tradable non-perishables and non-tradable services. With this categorization, we
have 14 perishables, 18 non-perishables, and 16 services.6
For each of 63,648 (48 ￿ 1;326) series of relative prices, we ￿rst compute volatility and
persistence measures. For volatility, we compute the standard deviations of qj;k;t (i) and
￿qj;k;t (i) = qj;k;t (i) ￿ qj;k;t￿1 (i) over time, which are reported in the ￿rst two upper panels
of Table 1. The volatility measures of each series are very close to the results of Parsley and
Wei (1996) who use the ACCRA Cost of Living Index over 1975:Q1 - 1992:Q4 and report
that the average standard deviation ranges from 12.9 to 14.9 percent. Turning to persistence,
we employ two measures, ￿OLS and ￿MU, each of which is obtained by estimating an AR(1)
model of qj;k;t (i) for each good and city pair separately (running 63,648 autoregressions in
total), using the ordinary least squares and the median unbiased estimator, respectively. The
two lower panels of Table 1 report the summary statistics of persistence measures across all
series. The averages over all goods and services are 0.52 for ￿OLS and 0.55 for ￿MU. These
values are consistent with the literature based on micro price data in that the half-lives are
much shorter in the disaggregated series than the aggregate series.7
2.2 Regression results
Our regressions evaluate the e⁄ect of trade cost on volatility and persistence of LOP devi-
ations. The literature has found that the volatility of the relative prices of the same goods
sold between two di⁄erent cities is positively associated with a proxy for the trade cost. The
trade cost is approximated by the log of the greater circle distance between two cities j and
k.8 The main di⁄erence between our analysis and the existing literature is that we also apply
6In particular, each category includes the following goods and services: Perishables are steak, ground beef,
frying chicken, milk, eggs, margarine, cheese, potatoes, bananas, lettuce, bread, hamburger, pizza, and fried
chicken; non-perishables are chunk light tuna, co⁄ee, sugar, corn ￿ akes, canned peas, canned peaches, facial
tissues, washing powder, shortening, frozen corn, soft drink, gasoline, toothpaste, shampoo, men￿ s shirt, tennis
balls, beer, and wine; and services are monthly rent for apartment, total home purchase price, mortgage rate,
monthly payment for house, total energy cost, telephone, auto maintenance, doctor, dentist, man￿ s haircut,
beauty salon, dry cleaning, appliance repair, newspaper subscription, a ￿rst-run movie ticket, and bowling.
7Regarding the half-life of the disaggregated relative prices for US cities, Parsley and Wei (1996) estimate
half-life to be from 4 to 15 quarters. Crucini and Shintani (2008) report 18 months and Yazgan and Yil-
mazkuday (2011) ￿nd half-lives ranging from 1.1 to 2.8 quarters. Our estimates of persistence are somewhat
low, compared to Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2011). The di⁄erence may arise because we use the AR(1) model
to measure the persistence while Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2011) use the sum of AR coe¢ cients.
8This approach of using the log of the greater circle distance to impose the concavity between the variability
and the distance was taken by Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (1996, 2001) and others.
5the distance regression to the persistence measure of the LOP deviations.
Table 2 reports the traditional volatility-distance regression results for a variety of spec-
i￿cations. When all goods are pooled (with good dummies), the volatility measures have
signi￿cantly positive correlations with the log-distance, based on heteroskedasticity consis-
tent standard errors reported below the estimates. The magnitudes of coe¢ cients are broadly
in line with the previous studies such as Parsley and Wei (1996) for the dependent variable
of std(q) and Engel and Rogers (1996) for the dependent variable of std(￿q).
For robustness, we also run regressions with the degree of price stickiness replacing good-
speci￿c dummy variables. This speci￿cation is in the spirit of Crucini, Shintani, and Tsuruga
(2010a) who discuss the e⁄ect of price stickiness on the variability of the LOP deviations.
Here, the degree of price stickiness is the probability of no price changes at a quarterly
frequency measured by (1￿fi)3, where fi is the monthly frequency of price changes calculated
from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).9 Although the regression ￿t substantially decreases in
terms of the adjusted R-squared when good dummies are replaced by a single regressor of
the degree of price stickiness, the coe¢ cient on the log-distance is essentially unaltered from
the case with good dummies. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients on the degree of price stickiness
(not reported in the table) are highly comparable, in both sign and magnitude, to CST who
use the Japanese micro price data and to Hickey and Jacks (2011) who use Canadian micro
price data.10
While the existing literature assigns an important role for trade costs in the determination
of LOP volatility, relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between trade
costs and LOP persistence. Table 3 shows results of persistence regressions where we regress
￿OLS and ￿MU on the same independent variables as the volatility regression in Table 2. The
table suggests a signi￿cant positive correlation between the persistence of the LOP deviations
and log-distance when we pool all goods in the regression. Again, all regressions include good
dummies except for regressions with price stickiness which use estimates of price stickiness
instead of good dummies.11 On average, a one percent increase in distance between cities
9Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) calculate the frequency of price changes for over 300 items in the US
using the underlying micro price data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to construct the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) over 1998 - 2005. For regressions, we matched the Entry Level Items in the CPI with items
in the ACCRA Cost of Living Index.
10In particular, the estimates are -0.032 with the standard errors of 0.001 for the dependent variable of
std(q) and -0.061 with the standard errors of 0.001 for the dependent variable of std(￿q). Our results remain
robust to the use of the di⁄erent measures of frequency of price changes by Bils and Klenow (2004) and
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008).
11As discussed in Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), Carvalho and Nechio (2011), and Crucini, Shintani, and
Tsuruga (2010b), the higher degree of price stickiness tends to give rise to higher persistence of the LOP
6leads to an increment of persistence by 0.02. When we split the categories of goods into
perishables, non-perishables, and services, we see signi￿cant positive correlations particularly
for tradable perishable and non-perishable goods.
Our ￿ndings on the relationship between persistence and distance are broadly consistent
with the few previous works on the topic. For example, Parsley and Wei (1996) report
positive coe¢ cients on the interaction terms of lagged relative prices and the (log) distance
in augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions of relative prices between pairs of US cities. Their
results imply that the convergence rate, measured by the sum of AR coe¢ cients, is slower
between cities of greater spatial separation. Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonara (2002) examine the
persistence of deviations from purchasing power parity (rather than LOP) using historical
aggregate price indexes of 19 US cities from 1918 to 1995, and ￿nd that both the sum of AR
coe¢ cients and half-lives are positively correlated with (log) distance. Choi and Matsubara
(2007) investigate sector-level price data from Japanese cities and ￿nd that, for 22 out of 36
items, the estimated half-lives are positively correlated with (log) distance after controlling for
the population di⁄erences between cities. Although estimation results from previous works
described above may not be directly comparable to ours due to di⁄ering data and methods,
the positive relationship between persistence and distance has been gaining empirical support
in the literature.
2.3 Theoretical prediction from the CST model
A natural question to ask is whether empirically tractable models of the intra-national LOP
deviations are consistent with the observed positive correlation between both LOP volatility
and persistence and distance. Our starting point is the two-city model developed by CST. In
their model, ￿rms in a city have a city-speci￿c labor productivity and the di⁄erence in the
log labor productivity zt (i) drive the short-run ￿ uctuations of the inter-city LOP deviations
qt (i). With the assumption that zt (i) follows a stationary AR(1) process with AR coe¢ cient
￿z(i) and that the ￿rm cannot change the prices with a probability ￿(i), one can express
dynamics of qt (i) by
qt (i) = ￿(i)qt￿1 (i) +
[(1 ￿ ￿(i)][1 ￿ ￿(i)￿]
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z(i)
(2s ￿ 1)zt (i); (1)
deviations. Indeed, the coe¢ cients for the degree of price stickiness are 0.209 when ￿OLS is used and 0.216
when ￿MU is used for the dependent variables, respectively.
7where s = 1=
h
1 + (1 + ￿)
1￿￿
i
> 1=2 is the ￿home bias￿ parameter and is an increasing
function of trade cost ￿ and the elasticity of substitution across varieties ￿, and ￿ is the
discount factor satisfying 0 < ￿ < 1. This home bias parameter can be interpreted as the
steady state expenditure share on home-made goods.
In equation (1), volatility increases with trade cost because a rise in ￿ increases 2s ￿ 1
and thus ampli￿es the ￿ uctuation of zt (i) via 2s￿1. In contrast, the persistence of the LOP
deviations is invariant to the trade cost ￿. For example, when ￿z(i) = 0, zt (i) becomes an
i.i.d. random variable, and the persistence of qt (i) corresponds to ￿(i). If ￿z(i) 6= 0 and
￿(i) = 0, the persistence of qt (i) is simply ￿z(i). Finally, if ￿z(i) 6= 0 and ￿(i) 6= 0, the
persistence is given by [￿(i) + ￿z(i)]=[1 + ￿(i)￿z(i)] which does not depend on s.
Crucini, Shintani, and Tsuruga (2010b) introduce sticky information about monetary
shocks into an international model of LOP deviations based on price stickiness in an attempt
to explain the relationship between the persistence and volatility of international LOP devia-
tions with the observed degrees of price stickiness. We could extend the CST￿ s intra-national
model of the LOP deviation by assuming this type of imperfect information on both monetary
shocks and shocks to labor productivity. Suppose that ￿rms cannot update their informa-
tion set with a probability !. The probability here is common across ￿rms in the economy.
By extending the CST model with sticky information, we can show that qt (i) follows the
second-order di⁄erence equation:
qt (i) = [￿(i) + !￿z (i)]qt￿1 (i)￿￿(i)!￿z (i)qt￿2 (i)+




This equation generalizes (1) but, once again, it can be shown that the persistence of qt (i) is
independent of trade cost ￿ under the extended model. Though the sticky information could
increases the persistence with a larger !, the increase occurs, irrespective of trade cost ￿. In
other words, it does not seem fruitful to focus on price stickiness or information frictions to
account for the correlation between distance and persistence, at least as these features have
been incorporated into recent models of the LOP.
In the next section, we show that heterogeneous imperfect information can explain the
relationship between the persistence and trade cost.
83 Model
3.1 Two-city model
The economy consists of two cities 1 and 2, both of which are located within the same country.
The economy is populated by a single representative household and a continuum of ￿rms.
Trade is over a continuum of goods between the two cities. Under monopolistic competition,
￿rms set prices to satisfy demand for a particular good in a particular city (i.e., pricing to
market). The representative household chooses consumption and labor supply over an in￿nite
horizon subject to a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. In what follows, the unit of time is
one quarter.
We consider three levels of constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregation. The
lowest level of aggregation is across brands v. Here, brands produced in city 1 are indexed
v 2 [0;1] while those produced in city 2 are indexed v 2 (1;2]. Integrating over brands






, where ￿ > 1. Here Cj;t(i) denotes the consumption
of good i consumed in city j and Cj;t(i;v) denotes consumption of brand v of good i sold
in city j. The middle level of aggregation across consumption in the two cities for good
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sponding CES price indexes at the lowest, middle, and highest levels are respectively de-


















Households in this economy trade complete state-contingent money claims and choose
consumption (Ct) and labor supply (Lt) over an in￿nite horizon subject to budget and cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraints. When household instantaneous utility is given by lnCt￿￿Lt, the
intra-temporal ￿rst-order condition between consumption and labor becomes Wt=Pt = ￿Ct
where Wt is the nominal wage rate. By substituting the CIA constraint ￿t = PtCt into
the condition, the nominal wage rate is proportional to the nominal money demand (or
equivalently the aggregate nominal expenditure): Wt = ￿￿t. In this paper, we assume that
the log of aggregate nominal expenditure (￿t = ln￿t) follows a random walk process:



















where Yt(i;v), Zt(i;v), ￿d
t(i;v), and Ld
t(i;v) denote output, exogenous productivity, and the
input of composite intermediate goods, and labor input, respectively. Here ￿ 2 [0;1) is
the share of intermediate goods representing the degree of strategic complementarities (see
Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf, 2004).
Note that the intermediate goods purchased by each ￿rm are a composite of all goods.






￿t where ￿t is aggregate intermediate goods de￿ned similarly to Ct with the brand-level in-
termediate goods sold in city j, ￿j;t (i;v). In addition, we assume that ￿rms must pay the
iceberg transportation cost ￿(> 0) to carry their goods between cities. Thus, the market
clearing conditions for each brand of each good satisfy
Yt(i;v) = [C1;t(i;v) + ￿1;t (i;v)] + (1 + ￿)[C2;t(i;v) + ￿2;t (i;v)] for v 2 [0;1] (5)
Yt(i;v) = (1 + ￿)[C1;t(i;v) + ￿1;t (i;v)] + [C2;t(i;v) + ￿2;t (i;v)] for v 2 (1;2]: (6)





t (i;v)dvdi = Lt.
We assume that productivity (zt (i;v) = lnZt(i;v)) is common across brands but speci￿c
to the good and the place of production:
zt (i;v) =
￿
z1;t (i) for v 2 [0;1]
z2;t (i) for v 2 (1;2] (7)
Furthermore, as a source of persistence, log-productivity in city ‘, namely z‘;t (i), follows a
stationary AR(1) process




‘;t (i) ￿ N(0;￿
2
z(‘)) (8)
with 0 < ￿z(i) < 1. Note that AR coe¢ cients can vary across goods so that variance of
z‘;t(i) is good-dependent. We further assume that ￿2
z(‘) is location speci￿c such that the
productivity innovations for good i are drawn from a distribution with dispersion that is
location speci￿c. This allows for the possibility that variation of technology shocks may di⁄er
across the place of production so that variance of z‘;t(i) is not only good-dependent but also
10is location dependent.12
3.2 Information structure
Following Angeletos and La￿ O (2009), we assume that each period is divided in two stages:
In stage 1, prices are set under imperfect information; In stage 2, the information on ￿t is
revealed, and consumption and employment choices are made taking the prices predetermined
in stage 1 as given. Building on the framework of Angeletos and La￿ O (2009), we introduce
retail managers who decide prices for each ￿rm. Managers set prices for the ￿rm￿ s brands in
the city in which they live. The retail managers are assumed to be fully informed about the
productivity of their own ￿rm, but imperfectly informed about the current state of nominal
aggregate demand.
In particular, in stage 1, retail managers receive idiosyncratic noisy signals xj;t (i;v) of ￿t:











We allow retail managers￿signals and variability of noise "x
j;t (i;v) to di⁄er across cities j. As
in the case of "z
‘;t (i), we assume that the variability ￿2
x(j) is location speci￿c such that shocks
to signals "x
j;t (i) are drawn from a distribution with dispersion that is location speci￿c. This
re￿ ects the assumption that retail managers are isolated in city j in terms of their information
and receive idiosyncratic signals of the nominal aggregate demand with di⁄erent levels of
precision.
In stage 2, the level of aggregate nominal expenditure becomes common knowledge. Let
Ij;t (i;v) and I0
j;t (i;v) be the information sets in period t, for the retail managers in city j at
stages 1 and 2, respectively. Within period t, the retail managers￿information set evolves as
follows:
Ij;t (i;v) = I
0
j;t￿1 (i;v) [ [xj;t(i;v);zt (i;v)] (10)
I
0
j;t (i;v) = Ij;t (i;v) [ f￿tg:
Note that the information is purely idiosyncratic: Since the information di⁄ers across j (i.e.,
where retail managers live) and brand v, the information set must specify the index j and v.
In the baseline model, we assume ￿ exible prices for all goods to focus attention on the
12For simplicity, the aggregate component of z‘;t (i) is assumed to be a constant (i.e.,
R
z‘;t (i)di is a
constant.)
11role of trade costs and information frictions. The log linearization of the optimal individual
prices, with suppressed constant terms, yields,
pj;t (i;v) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ej;t (￿tji;v) + ￿Ej;t (ptji;v) ￿ zt (i;v); (11)
where pj;t (i;v) = lnPj;t (i;v), pt = lnPt, and Ej;t (￿ji;v) denotes the expectations operator
conditional on Ij;t (i;v). Note that ￿t appears in the pricing equation because the nominal
wage rate in our model is proportional to the aggregate nominal expenditure.13
The log price index for good i sold in city 1 can be approximated by
p1;t (i) = s
Z 1
0




The price of the same good sold in city 2, p2;t (i), is similarly derived. Recall that the
expenditure share s represents the degree of expenditure bias toward home-made goods.
According to (12), this home bias makes the home city price index more sensitive to a price
of home-produced goods than that of goods produced in the other city. Since a larger home
bias is caused by more costly transportation of goods, s is increasing in ￿.
3.3 Results
We now investigate equilibrium dynamics of the LOP deviations, focusing on implications
of noisy information. In what follows, we de￿ne the LOP deviations between two cities as
qt (i) = ln[P2;t (i)=P1;t (i)]. To solve the model with noisy information, we utilize the method
of undetermined coe¢ cients to ￿nd the solution for qt (i). We leave the detailed derivation
for Appendix A.1 and focus on key equations in what follows.
We use a standard signal extraction problem to specify the expectations on ￿t:
Ej;t (￿tji;v) = ￿jxj;t (i;v) + (1 ￿ ￿j)￿t￿1 for j = 1;2; (13)




that a larger ￿j implies more precise signals because it corresponds to a smaller ￿2
x(j). We
make the following guess for the form of the aggregate price index: pt = c0￿t+c1￿t￿1, where c0
13In general, the optimal prices di⁄er across the location of sales because of the presence of the trade cost.
However, since we suppressed the constant term which depends on the trade cost, (11) can be used for both
cases of j = ‘ and j 6= ‘.
12and c1 are undetermined coe¢ cients. Given the guess for pt, combining (12) and (13) yields
p1;t (i) = (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)￿1"
￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0 + ￿c1)￿t￿1 ￿ sz1;t (i) ￿ (1 ￿ s)z2;t (i); (14)
where we use the fact that the integration over the individual signals washes out idiosyncratic
noise "x
j;t(i;v). The relative price qt (i) = p2;t (i) ￿ p1;t (i) is then given by
qt (i) = ￿"
￿
t + (2s ￿ 1)zt (i); (15)
where zt (i) = z1;t (i) ￿ z2;t (i), ￿ = [(1 ￿ ￿) ^ ￿]=(1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿), ￿ ￿ = (￿1 + ￿2)=2 and ^ ￿ = ￿2 ￿ ￿1.
As shown in (15), LOP deviations are driven by two components, an i.i.d. shock to the
aggregate nominal expenditure "￿
t and the technological di⁄erentials between two cities zt (i).
To see the intuition why "￿
t matters for qt (i), note that randomly drawn variance of noise
￿2
x(j) in each city j leads to di⁄erent precision of signals of the nominal demand shocks across
cities. Individual prices could respond to signals more strongly in a city with more precise
signals than in the other city. This di⁄erence in responses of prices to the aggregate nominal
expenditure between cities gives rise to a deviation of price indexes across the two cities in
the impact period. However, this information di⁄erential only lasts for one period because
"￿
t is assumed to be common knowledge in the next period. Thus, the prices revert to their
steady state values and the LOP deviation caused by the informational di⁄erential disappears
in the next period.
In (15), the LOP deviations are also driven by zt (i). Here zt (i) represents the technological
di⁄erence between two cities and its coe¢ cient (2s￿1) is increasing in the degree of home bias
s. To understand how zt (i) a⁄ects LOP deviations, suppose that the place-of-production-
speci￿c shock z1;t (i) increases by one percent. The technological improvement in city 1
decreases the price index in city 1 by larger amount than the price index in city 2 due to
home bias in the price index (i.e., s > 1=2). Thus qt (i) remains above the steady state value
until z1;t (i) converges to its steady state level.






￿ + (2s ￿ 1)2var[zt (i)]; (16)
and
￿q(i) =
(2s ￿ 1)2var[zt (i)]
￿
2￿2
￿ + (2s ￿ 1)2var[zt (i)]
￿z(i): (17)
13The following proposition summarizes properties on the short-run dynamics of the LOP
deviations.
Proposition 1 Under the preference assumption of lnC ￿ ￿L, the CIA constraint, the as-
sumption on the stochastic processes of aggregate nominal expenditure (3) and productivity
(8), and the pricing assumption with imperfect information speci￿ed as (9) and (10), LOP
deviations have the following properties:





1. When information on ￿t is perfect (i.e., ￿x(1) ! 0 and ￿x(2) ! 0), ￿q(i) is independent




2. When information on ￿t is imperfect and managers in di⁄erent cities have asymmetric
information precision about the state of aggregate nominal demand (i.e., ^ ￿ 6= 0), ￿q(i)




The proposition implies that, assuming that distance between two locations is a proxy
for trade cost ￿, the model with perfect information can account for the observed positive
volatility-distance correlation but fails to predict the observed positive persistence-distance
correlation. In contrast, the imperfect information can account for both observations.
To see the intuition for property (i), again suppose there is a one percent increase in the
productivity of city 1. If trade cost is absent, the steady state expenditure share s equals
1/2, which implies that price indexes in both cities fall by the same amount and the relative
price, qt (i) = p2;t (i)￿p1;t (i), remains unchanged. In contrast, the presence of the trade cost
causes home bias and price index in city 1 falls more than that in city 2. Higher trade costs
amplify this expenditure asymmetry which causes higher volatility of relative prices.
As shown above, the model cannot account for a positive correlation between persistence
and trade cost under perfect information. In this case, an increase in ￿t leads to an increase
in the price index in both cities but the e⁄ect of a change in ￿t on the price indexes cancels
14out because managers increase prices by the same amount in the two cities. As a result, the
relative prices are solely determined by the technological di⁄erences and the persistence of
qt (i) corresponds to the persistence of zt (i) which is independent of the trade cost.
The ￿nal property in Proposition 1 can be explained as follows: When heterogeneous im-
perfect information is present, (15) shows that the persistence of qt (i) are determined by the
persistence of "￿
t and zt (i). The relative volatility of aggregate nominal demand and produc-
tivity shocks matters for the persistence of the LOP deviations because the persistence of "￿
t
is zero while that of zt (i) is ￿z (i) > 0. Now, suppose that the trade cost is completely absent.
Under no home bias (2s ￿ 1 = 0), technological di⁄erentials do not a⁄ect LOP deviations.
Instead, the i.i.d. shock "￿
t drives LOP deviations and thus, the LOP deviation follows an
i.i.d. process. However, if a trade cost is present, technological di⁄erentials contribute to
￿ uctuations of qt (i) and increase the persistence of qt (i) via the persistence of zt (i). As a
result, the persistence of LOP deviations becomes larger as trade cost becomes higher because
technological di⁄erentials have a larger weight in generating persistence.14
The results here do not hold when z‘;t (i) is independent of the place of production ‘.
However, Appendix A.2 shows that, if the model has city-speci￿c preference shocks biased
toward home-made goods and if the preference shocks in the two cities are persistent, the same
qualitative results are obtained. Thus, our results do not critically depend on the presence
of technology shocks speci￿c to the place of production.
3.4 Numerical examples
To see the e⁄ect of noisy information from various sources, we conduct some sensitivity analy-
sis on the relationship of volatility and persistence with trade cost by changing parameters
in ￿: In the benchmark calibration, we set parameters so that the persistence and standard
deviations implied from the model roughly match those from the data in Table 1, which re-
ports that ￿q and std[q (i)] are, on average, 0.52 and 14 percent respectively. In particular,
for the source of the relative price ￿ uctuations, we set ￿z at 0.55, the average of ￿z (‘) at 0.20
and ￿￿ at 0.10.15 For the city-speci￿c degrees of imperfect information which determines ￿j,
the signal-to-noise ratios are ￿2
x (1)=￿2
￿ = 3 and ￿2
x (2)=￿2
￿ = 1=3, leading to ￿1 = 0:75 and
14Indeed, the relative importance of technological di⁄erence on the persistence of LOP can be measured by
the coe¢ cient of ￿z (i) in (17).
15To match the volatility of the LOP deviations from the model with the data, we set ￿￿ at 10 percent,
which is large compared with the data where the standard deviation of nominal GDP over the 1990:Q1 -
2007:Q1 period is only 0.5 percent. However, under the model with price stickiness in Section 4.2, ￿￿ is
reduced to a level comparable with the data.
15￿2 = 0:25. These calibrations imply that ￿ ￿ = 0:50 and ^ ￿ = 0:50. We set ￿ = 0:90 and ￿ = 4,
consistent with the literature.16 Finally, we allow the trade cost to vary in the range (0;0:50].
Figure 1 recon￿rms the properties obtained in Proposition 1. The right panel of the ￿gure
shows that, regardless of values of information di⁄erentials, the volatility of LOP deviations
depends positively on ￿. In contrast, the ￿gure also shows that the curves for the persistence
in the left panel are upward-sloping only when ^ ￿ is non-zero. If ^ ￿ = 0 as in the case of perfect
information, the curve for the persistence is ￿ at at ￿z(i) = 0:55.
The ￿gure also compares the impact of ^ ￿ on persistence and volatility by changing ^ ￿
from 0.25 to 1.0 while holding ￿ ￿ at 0.50. This increase in ^ ￿ can be interpreted as a larger
information di⁄erential between cities, and thus ￿, ceteris paribus, increases. The increase
in ￿ leads to a decline in the persistence of the LOP deviation because a larger information
di⁄erential increases the weight of the i.i.d. nominal demand shock relative to the weight of the
persistent productivity shock in the determination of the LOP deviation. A larger information
di⁄erential generates higher volatility via a larger ￿, but, under our parameterization, the
quantitative impact is small.
Figure 2 shows the impact of ￿ ￿ on persistence and volatility by changing ￿ ￿ from 0.25 to
0.75 while holding ^ ￿ = 0:5. A low value of ￿ ￿ corresponds to the lower degree of information
precision for the economy as a whole, because ￿ ￿ is the average of the Kalman gains that are
positively related to precision of signals received in the two cities. When signals of ￿t are
noisier, retail managers￿pricing becomes less sensitive to changes in the aggregate nominal
demand and ￿ declines. Hence, the LOP deviations are more persistent (See the left panel
of Figure 2). Once again, however, the right panel shows shifts of the curve for volatility
appears to be virtually una⁄ected.
Finally, Figure 3 conducts a sensitivity analysis regarding strategic complementarities.
In Woodford￿ s (2003) model of monetary non-neutrality where prices ￿ uctuate according to
shocks to aggregate nominal expenditure, he has emphasized that strategic complementarities
can generate substantial persistence in output dynamics. In our model of LOP deviations,
strategic complementarities also a⁄ect both the persistence and volatility of relative prices.
Stronger strategic complementarities raise the persistence because price indexes are more
persistent, through smaller ￿. However, smaller ￿ also dampens the volatility, since the
e⁄ect of "￿
t on the relative price is weakened by a smaller ￿. Thus, there is a tradeo⁄
between matching the persistence and volatility of LOP deviations when using the strategic
16See Angeletos and La￿ O (2009) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) for ￿. We follow Broda and Weinstein
(2006) to calibrate ￿.
16complementarity parameter.
4 Extensions
4.1 Introducing price stickiness
The baseline model assumes that prices of all goods are completely ￿ exible for simplicity.
Empirical studies on micro price data, however, have discovered substantial heterogeneity in
the degree of price stickiness across goods. The empirical results in Section 2 also controlled
for price stickiness instead of using good dummies and found that trade cost remains positively
correlated with volatility and persistence. This subsection introduces price stickiness into the
baseline model to see whether our analytical results are robust to the extension. To this
end, we follow Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) and CST who assume Calvo-type price stickiness
where the degree of price stickiness di⁄ers across goods but is common across locations. Each
period, retail managers can reset their price with a constant probability 1 ￿ ￿(i). In what
follows, we set the degree of strategic complementarities ￿ at zero because it allows us to
analytically derive the e⁄ect of sticky prices.
Appendix A.3 shows that the log-approximated reset price p￿
j;t (i;v), with suppressed
constant terms, takes the following form:
p
￿




h Ej;t [￿t+h ￿ zt+h (i;v)ji;v]: (18)
This optimal reset price equals the weighted average of the expected current and all future
marginal costs due to the non-zero probability of being unable to change prices. Likewise,
Calvo-type price stickiness changes the evolution of the log-price index in city 1 to















The log-price index in city 2 is similarly derived. Appendix A.3 also shows that the LOP
deviations are given by the ￿rst-order di⁄erence equation:







(2s ￿ 1)zt (i)
￿
: (20)
As discussed in Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), the Calvo-type price stickiness raises the per-
17sistence of the LOP deviations.17 In this ￿rst-order di⁄erence equation, shocks to qt (i) are
^ ￿"￿
t + [1 ￿ ￿(i)￿]=[1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿](2s ￿ 1)zt (i). This term has interpretations similar to (15).
Indeed, this expression consists of a temporary nominal shock and a persistent technological
di⁄erential. The coe¢ cient for "￿
t is ^ ￿, which corresponds to ￿ in (15) when ￿ = 0. The
coe¢ cient on zt (i) is [1 ￿ ￿(i)￿]=[1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z(i)](2s￿1) which is again increasing in trade
cost. The new multiplier [1 ￿ ￿(i)￿]=[1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z(i)] (￿ 1) re￿ ects that sticky prices make
retail managers respond less to shocks to technology compared to the case of ￿ exible prices.
Because the expression inside the brackets in (20) takes a similar form to (15), the properties
in Proposition 1 can be applied to this expression and the same intuition continues to hold. In
other words, the higher trade cost still gives rise to more volatile and persistent qt (i) through
larger home bias, though the quantitative implications are di⁄erent.
Using the model with price stickiness, we again investigate whether the model can explain
the observed empirical regularities by calibration. In addition to the parameterization ￿ = 0
for simplicity, we set parameters in the model to match the persistence and volatility from the
data. In the numerical example for the ￿ exible price model, we set ￿￿ to 0.10, substantially
larger than the data. In the case of the sticky price model, the value of ￿￿ is now parameterized
to a value much closer to the data: ￿￿ = 0:01. We set ￿z (i) at a low value 0.30 in comparison
with the previous case since sticky prices generate persistence of qt (i) and thus there is less
need for persistence in the real shocks. We set ￿(i) at 0.30, which implies prices remain ￿xed
for 4.3 months, consistent with Bils and Klenow (2004).18 Other parameters continue to be
the same as the case of ￿ exible prices: ￿z (‘) = 0:20 on average, and ￿ = 4.
Figure 4 shows that the persistence increases with trade cost only in the case of non-zero
information di⁄erentials and the volatility is positively correlated with trade cost regardless
of the information di⁄erentials. However, persistence is now very insensitive to changes in
trade cost. With price stickiness, persistence of qt (i) is determined by persistence both from
17In the international setting, Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) argue that persistence and volatility of the LOP
deviations should increase with ￿(i). In particular, their equation for the LOP deviations is given by
qt (i) = ￿(i)qt￿1 (i) + ￿(i)￿St;
where ￿St denotes the nominal exchange rate growth. However, they focus on the relationship between the
degree of price stickiness and the persistence (as well as the volatility), instead of the relationship between
trade costs and the persistence.
18The value of ￿(i) used here implies somewhat shorter duration of price changes than the median duration
of regular price changes reported by other micro price studies using US data. In particular, the reported
months are 6.9 months by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and 11.1 month by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
When we use these values for simulation, the persistence implied from the model is larger than the persistence
in the data. Though this gap appears to be interesting anomaly, we leave it for future research.
18price stickiness and from technological di⁄erence. Since only the latter depends on trade cost,
it weakens sensitivity of qt (i) to ￿. Thus, persistence increases only by small amount relative
to the previous calibration.
4.2 Multi-city model
The baseline model also assumes only two cities in the economy. A realistic and straightfor-
ward exercise may be to increase the number of cities in the model shown in the previous
subsection and to explore the implications of multi-city setting for the relationships of trade
cost with persistence and volatility. Under this assumption, we note that the price index in












The equation (19) is generalized to

















where we suppress constant terms and the home bias parameter is now given by
s =
1
1 + (N ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)
1￿￿:
The equation of the log optimal price (18) remains unchanged. Equation (22) tells us that the
price index in a city is a⁄ected by prices of goods produced in all cities in the economy. The
expenditure share s declines as the number of cities increases. Let qj;k;t (i) = pj;t (i) ￿ pk;t (i)
be the LOP deviations between city j and k. By taking a simplifying assumption that trade
costs are common across cities, it can be shown that















where zk;j;t (i) = zk;t (i;k) ￿ zj;t (i) and ^ ￿j;k = ￿j ￿ ￿k.
Compared to (20) in the case of only two cities, whereas the coe¢ cient for "￿
t remains
unchanged, that for technological di⁄erence is a⁄ected by the number of cities. In particular,
the former depends on the information di⁄erential between two cities ^ ￿j;k and independent
19of N but, in contrast, the latter declines as N increases. In fact, the expenditure share on
home-made goods declines and the ￿ uctuations in technological di⁄erential is more weakly
transmitted to the LOP deviations.
Nevertheless, the underlying structure of the LOP deviations shown in (23) is similar in
structure to that under two-city model. The LOP deviations still include both temporary and
persistent components and the coe¢ cient on the technological di⁄erential zk;j;t (i) remains an
increasing function of ￿. This assures that an increase in trade cost generates a stronger home
bias, giving rise to a larger contribution of technological di⁄erentials to ￿ uctuations of the
LOP deviations. Figure 5 presents the persistence and volatility of qj;k;t (i) under N = 2;3;
and 5. While the persistence of LOP deviations is less sensitive to changes in trade cost for
a larger N, the curve for persistence is still upward-sloping over various ￿. The volatility
decreases for small N, but continues to show a positive correlation between the volatility and
trade cost. Therefore, higher trade cost implies more persistent and more volatile relative
prices under the multi-city model with imperfect information.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates micro data on individual good price di⁄erences across US cities to
provide empirical evidence that persistence, as well as volatility, of intra-national LOP de-
viations are positively correlated with the distance between cities. To explain the empirical
￿ndings, we develop a simple model of time-varying technology combined with imperfect in-
formation about nominal demand shocks. Assuming that distance between two locations is
a proxy for trade cost, we found that the model with perfect information can account for
the observed positive volatility-distance correlation but fails to predict the observed positive
persistence-distance correlation. In contrast, imperfect information about aggregate nominal
demand can account for both observations. The key mechanism of imperfect information is
that shocks arising from imperfect information are temporary while shocks from technology
which are ampli￿ed by trade cost are long-lived. When the trade costs are low, the e⁄ect of
the temporary nominal shock is strong relative to the e⁄ect of persistent real shocks on the
persistence of LOP deviations. When the trade costs are high, the former is weak relative
to the latter and the persistence of LOP deviations approaches the persistence of technology
shocks. Without the imperfect information, this change in relative contribution between nom-
inal and real shocks does not arise because nominal shocks do not contribute to persistence
in LOP deviations. Our ￿ndings suggest the importance of imperfect information for better
20understanding persistent and volatile LOP deviations.
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23A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of (15)
Our guess for the aggregate price index is given by
pt = c0￿t + c1￿t￿1: (24)
This conjecture can be supported by the facts that retail managers who make their forecast
of ￿t use the Kalman ￿lter to express the forecast as a function of ￿t￿1 and their own signal
xj;t (i;v) of which the cross-sectional average equals ￿t. Furthermore, the aggregate prices are
independent on the good-speci￿c technology shock z‘;t (i), because the cross-sectional average
of z‘;t (i) across goods are assumed to be a constant. In this conjecture, we suppress a constant
term since we focus on LOP persistence and volatility.
Under the conjecture, the optimal price of brand v of good i consumed in city j can be
written as
pj;t (i;v) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ej;t (￿tji;v) + ￿c0Ej;t (￿tji;v) + ￿c1￿t￿1 ￿ zt (i;v); (25)
from (11). Combining (12), (13) and (25) for j = 1 yields
p1;t (i) = s(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)￿1
Z 1
0




+[(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)(1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿c1]￿t￿1 ￿ sz1;t (i) ￿ (1 ￿ s)z2;t (i)
= (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)￿1￿t + [(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)(1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿c1]￿t￿1 ￿ sz1;t (i) ￿ (1 ￿ s)z2;t (i)
= (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)￿1"
￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0 + ￿c1)￿t￿1 ￿ sz1;t (i) ￿ (1 ￿ s)z2;t (i);
where we use the fact that
R 1
0 x1;t (i;v)dv =
R 2
1 x1;t (i;v)dv = ￿t and "￿
t = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 from (3).
This equation corresponds to (14) in the main text. Similarly, we can obtain p2;t (i):
p2;t (i) = (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)￿2"
￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0 + ￿c1)￿t￿1 ￿ sz2;t (i) ￿ (1 ￿ s)z1;t (i): (27)
By taking the relative price, we have
qt (i) = (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0) ^ ￿"
￿
t + (2s ￿ 1)zt (i): (28)








. The average of pj;t (i) across two cities is






Taking the integral of this equation across goods (with suppressed constant terms) yields
pt = (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0) ￿ ￿￿t + [(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿c1]￿t￿1;
since
R 1
0 z1;t (i)di and
R 2
1 z2;t (i)di are constant. Matching coe¢ cients on ￿t in the above
equation gives
c0 =
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
(29)
Finally, arranging terms in the coe¢ cient on "￿
t in (28) yields (15).
A.2 Replacing technology shock with preference shock
In this appendix, we shut down ￿ uctuations of z‘;t (i) but introduce the preference shock








, where ￿1;t denotes the time-varying
preference parameter toward goods produced in city 1 and P2;t(i) is analogously de￿ned. The
de￿nition of Cj;t (i) and ￿j;t (i) also changes, similarly to Pj;t (i). Likewise, suppose that the
preference shock is given by ￿j;t = ￿exp(uj;t) where uj;t follows an AR(1) process:
uj;t (i) = ￿uuj;t￿1 (i) + "u;t (i):
The log price index for good i sold in city 1 is given by
p1;t (i) = s
Z 1
0





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
u1;t (i); (30)
where s = ￿=
h
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
1￿￿
i
. Here, trade costs lead to a nonzero coe¢ cient on
uj;t (i). Under z‘;t (i) = 0 for all t, the optimal price set by retail managers are
pj;t (i;v) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ej;t (￿tji;v) + ￿Ej;t (ptji;v): (31)
25Combining (30) and (31) yields
pj;t (i) = s(1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
0












(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
uj;t (i):
Using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, we note that the price index for good i should
have a solution similar to (28):
pj;t (i) = (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0)￿j"
￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿c0 + ￿c1)￿t￿1 ￿
s ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
uj;t (i);
Taking the di⁄erence of the price indexes for good i between two cities, we have the LOP
deviations:




(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
ut (i);
where ut (i) = u1;t (i) ￿ u2;t (i). The coe¢ cient of "￿
t in the above equation has the same
structure as that in (28). Hence, from (29), we obtain




(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
ut (i): (32)
Note that the coe¢ cient of ut (i) is increasing in ￿, since s is positively correlated with ￿.
Therefore, with preference shocks, we can obtain the same qualitative results as Proposition 1
even if technology shocks speci￿c to the place of production are not introduced in the model.
A.3 Introducing price stickiness
Under Calvo pricing, retail managers in city j choose the reset price to maximize the ex-
pected discounted sum of pro￿ts from each market. The demand for their brand is given by
(1=2)[Pj;t (i;v)=Pj;t+h (i)]
￿￿ Cj;t+h (i). Under ￿ = 0, the reset price of goods consumed in city




























26Here we used the ￿rst order conditions for labor supply and money demand to replace Wt






























Without loss of generality, we can consider retail managers who set prices for ￿rms producing
in city 1. Let P ￿
1;t (i;v) and P ￿
2;t (i;v) be the optimal reset price to solve the maximization
problems to sell their goods in cities 1 and 2, respectively. The ￿rst order condition for
P ￿

























































for ￿rms located in city 1. (i.e., v 2 [0;1].) In terms of the log optimal reset prices,
p
￿




h E1;t [￿t+h ￿ zt+h (i;v)ji;v];
for j = 1;2. As discussed in the footnote 13, trade costs do not a⁄ect the log-linearized
optimal prices when the constant term arising from linearization is suppressed. Given the
stochastic process of aggregate nominal expenditure and technology, the equation reduces to
p
￿
j;t (i;v) = Ej;t [￿tji;v] ￿
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z (i)
zt (i;v):
We next consider the log price index for good i sold in city 1. Due to random sampling

















27The log-linear approximation yields




1;t (i) is given by
p
￿











In the above equation, we can interprete p￿
1;t (i) as the weighted average of reset prices for
goods sold in city 1. This weighted average can be rewritten as
p
￿


















2;t (i) can be analogously derived. Let q￿
t (i) = p￿
2;t (i) ￿ p￿


























1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z (i)
(2s ￿ 1)[z1;t (i) ￿ z2;t (i)]:
Using the steady state Kalman ￿lter, we have
q
￿





















￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)[(1 ￿ s)￿t￿1 + s￿t￿1]
+
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z (i)
(2s ￿ 1)[z1;t (i) ￿ z2;t (i)]
= (￿2 ￿ ￿1)(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) +
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿
1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z (i)





1 ￿ ￿(i)￿￿z (i)
(2s ￿ 1)zt (i); (34)
28where the second equality comes from the fact that
R 1
0 xj;t (i;v)dv =
R 2
1 xj;t (i;v)dv = ￿t and
the third equality is from (3). By combining the de￿nition of the LOP deviations, (33), and
(34), we can obtain (20).
29Table 1: Summary statistics
Avg. Std. Obs.
std(q)
All 0.136 0.038 63,648
Perishables 0.154 0.042 18,564
Non-perishables 0.133 0.030 23,868
Services 0.124 0.039 21,216
std(￿q)
All 0.127 0.049 63,648
Perishables 0.163 0.055 18,564
Non-perishables 0.129 0.033 23,868
Services 0.093 0.036 21,216
￿OLS
All 0.520 0.151 63,648
Perishables 0.417 0.115 18,564
Non-perishables 0.481 0.096 23,868
Services 0.654 0.136 21,216
￿MU
All 0.552 0.156 63,648
Perishables 0.445 0.119 18,564
Non-perishables 0.512 0.100 23,868
Services 0.692 0.141 21,216
NOTES: Each number in the table refers to the basic cross-sectional statistics of time-series prop-
erties of qj;k;t(i). The sample period is over 1990:Q1 - 2007:Q4. The LOP deviations are calculated
from the log of the relative price of a good or service in a city to the same good or service in a
di⁄erent city. In the ￿rst two panels, std(q) is the standard deviation over time of qj;k;t(i) for
all possible city pairs and std(￿q) is the standard deviation over time for the ￿rst di⁄erence in
qj;k;t(i). The persistence is measured by ￿OLS and ￿MU shown in the third and fourth panels. We
estimate ￿OLS and ￿MU from AR(1) estimates by good-by-good ordinary least squares and median
unbiased estimator, respectively. In each column, ￿ Avg.￿and ￿ Std.￿denote the average and standard
deviations across goods. The ￿ Obs.￿denotes the number of observations.
30Table 2: Volatility-distance regressions
Dependent var. Goods Log-distance ￿ R2
std(q) All 0.008 0.45
(0.0002)
All (with price stickiness) 0.008 0.03
(0.0003)
Category-by-category
(i) Perishables 0.010 0.57
(0.0004)
(ii) Non-perishables 0.007 0.48
(0.0003)
(iii) Services 0.008 0.31
(0.001)
std(￿q) All 0.005 0.52
(0.0003)
All (with price stickiness) 0.005 0.05
(0.0004)
Category-by-category
(i) Perishables 0.005 0.65
(0.0004)
(ii) Non-perishables 0.003 0.60
(0.0002)
(iii) Services 0.006 0.21
(0.001)
NOTES: The estimation is based on cross-sectional regressions of the LOP variability on the log-
distance with good dummies or the degree of price stickiness. The number in each row in the third
column is the coe¢ cient on the log-distance and the numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors. The ￿ R2 in the last column is the adjusted R-squared. The upper panel
shows the regression results when the standard deviation of qj;k;t(i) is used for the dependent variable
and the lower panel shows the regression results when the standard deviation of the ￿rst-di⁄erenced
qj;k;t(i) is used for the dependent variable. The number of observations in regressions are 18,564 for
perishable, 23,868 for non-perishables, 21,216 for services, 63,648 for all items, and 58,344 for the
estimation with price stickiness because there are no data of price stickiness for four items related to
shelters (i.e., monthly rent for apartment, total home purchase price, mortgage rate, and monthly
payment for house).
31Table 3: Persistence-distance regressions
Dependent var. Goods Log-distance ￿ R2
￿OLS All 0.020 0.40
(0.001)
All (with price stickiness) 0.019 0.05
(0.001)
Category-by-category
(i) Perishables 0.030 0.26
(0.002)
(ii) Non-perishables 0.029 0.22
(0.002)
(iii) Services 0.002 0.34
(0.002)
￿MU All 0.021 0.42
(0.001)
All (with price stickiness) 0.020 0.10
(0.001)
Category-by-category
(i) Perishables 0.031 0.26
(0.002)
(ii) Non-perishables 0.030 0.22
(0.002)
(iii) Services 0.002 0.34
(0.002)
NOTES: The estimation is based on cross-sectional regressions of the LOP persistence on the log-
distance with good dummies or the degree of price stickiness. The upper panel shows the regression
results when the OLS estimate of AR(1) regression for qj;k;t(i) is used for the dependent variable
and the lower panel shows the regression results when the median unbiased estimate is used for the
dependent variable. See also the notes of Table 2 for remaining details.
32Figure 1: E⁄ect of information di⁄erential ^ ￿ on persistence and volatility of LOP deviations
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33Figure 2: E⁄ect of average information precision ￿ ￿ on persistence and volatility of LOP
deviations
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34Figure 3: E⁄ect of pricing complementarities ￿ on persistence and volatility of LOP deviations





































35Figure 4: Introducing sticky prices
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36Figure 5: Multi-city model
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